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Abstract: In accounting research, the role of organizational leaders
has been underrepresented. The limited research dealing with leadership issues has focused on the impact of leadership on micro activities such as performance evaluation, budget satisfaction, and audit
team performance. The impact of leadership on the structure of accounting and audit systems and organizations has been ignored.
This paper focuses on the impact that past Comptrollers General
have had on the working and structure of one federal audit agency,
the United States General Accounting Office (GAO). In addition, it
also focuses on the influence of the two most recent Comptrollers
General on one important audit related activity, i.e., the audit report
review process. Using qualitative field research methods, this paper
documents how the organizational leadership impacts its long-term
audit practices and thereby influences auditing, especially in the public sector.

Few would question that leadership has an effect on
the goals and structure
of complex
organizations
[Galaskiewicz and Shatin, 1981, p. 434].
The effect of organizational leadership on an organization's
structure and processes has been documented in the managem e n t literature [see for e.g., Kanter, 1977; Granovetter, 1974].
More recently, the management literature has observed that the
s t u d y of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l l e a d e r s h i p is w o r t h y of c o n c e r n
[Cunningham, 1992] due to the impact that these leaders have
on the work processes of organizations. Organizational leaders
often have ideological patterns [Covey, 1991] which are imbued
The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful
a n d insightful comments.
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in organizational structures and processes, thereby affecting
quality management [Farguhar, 1991], organizational perform a n c e [Hoffman, 1989] and ultimately, the survival of the organization itself [Hasenfeld and Schmid, 1989].
In accounting, the effect of leadership has been examined
with reference to budgeting issues [Brownwell, 1983] and performance evaluation [Hopwood, 1974]. In the auditing arena,
leadership has been studied with particular focus on its effects
on audit team performance, audit task complexity [Jiambalvo
and Pratt, 1982] and dysfunctional auditor behavior [Kelley and
Margheim, 1990]. However, this prior work had focused on auditing in the private sector. In contrast, there has been relatively
little research on examining the effects of leadership in public
sector auditing.
The United States General Accounting Office (GAO) is an
extremely important audit organization whose oversight activities cover all agencies that receive federal handing (except the
Central Intelligence Agency). That includes the $4 trillion public
debt, the $1.5 trillion federal budget and the $250 million annual interest on the debt. The chief executive officer of the GAO
is known as the Comptroller General. As the leader of such an
organization, the Comptroller General has the ability and opportunity to influence the structure and direction of the audit
activities of the GAO. In particular, with reference to the
researcher's fieldwork, past Comptrollers General have placed a
great deal of attention on modifying the primary vehicle with
which the GAO communicates with such external constituents
as Congress and the press.
This primary vehicle is in the form of audit reports which
are important to Congress as support for testimonies relating to
the effective discharge of its stewardship function. This is documented by their use, in as many as 217 testimonies in 1989
[GAO, 1989] and 306 in 1990 [GAO, 1990] an increased demand
of 4 1 % in one year. According to Walker [1986, p. 131], these
audit reports also allow members of Congress to claim credit in
the eyes of the press and others for identifying and acting on
pervasive problems in government. The press, in turn, uses GAO
audit reports as an information source on government operations.
The first draft of the audit report is essentially a team effort
that almost exclusively involves only the audit team members
located in the practitioner component of the professional buhttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol21/iss1/13
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reaucracy [Freidson, 1986; Mintzberg, 1979]. Thereafter, this
first draft goes through a review process by such members of
the administrative component [Freidson, 1986] as the report review staff within divisions and the offices outside of the division
such as the Office of General Counsel (OGC), and the Office of
the Chief Economist (OCE). It is during this process that the
report is modified and refined into a final product.
In 1978, a task force of the Government Oversight Committee, chaired by Congressman Jack Brooks, reported on the
GAO's view of report review by commenting that "each proposed report must be reviewed at appropriate levels within the
office, to make sure that it is of high quality and that it conforms to their approved policies and standards" [p. 33]. It was
this task force that identified lack of report timeliness as being a
major complaint against the GAO. On this subject, a member of
the GAO History Program who participated in the study observed, "the audit report review process has often been considered the cause of lack of timeliness by the GAO in presentation
of its reports." The member also said, "Because people outside
are scrutinizing the reports, the GAO would rather be right and
late than on time and wrong." The emphasis on being "right"
has manifested itself in the rigorous audit report review process
of the GAO.
The purpose of this study is two-fold. One purpose is to
examine the influence of past Comptrollers General on the overall workings of the GAO. The second purpose is to examine the
influence of the two most recent Comptrollers General (i.e.,
Elmer Staats and Charles Bowsher) on one of the more important activities of the GAO, i.e., the audit report review process.

RESEARCH CONTEXT AND METHODS
Research Context
The United States GAO, headed by the Comptroller General
of the United States, was formed by Congress in 1921 as a result
of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. It was intended to be
an independent, non-partisan agency whose purpose was to assist in Congressional oversight of the executive branch of the
Federal government. In the United States, the Constitution gives
final authority over public finances to Congress. The GAO is
responsible to the Congress to provide information it needs
about the safeguarding and administration of public funds. This
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assistance takes the form of audits, which serve as preventive
control by identifying illegality, fraud, waste, extravagance, and
reports on the soundness of policies, programs, and projects
[Brown, 1970, p. 9],
As Charles A. Bowsher, Comptroller General of the United
States (GAO, 1987), observed:
. . . as an a r m of the Congress, GAO's basic mission is to
look for ways in which the government can better and
more efficiently meet the needs of the people.
The GAO, as an organization, has received relatively little
research scrutiny. Rourke [1978] attributed this lack of academic attention to the image of the GAO as an agency concerned exclusively with routine fiscal auditing. However, the
GAO now undertakes audits of a general policy-oriented nature
such as the evaluation of programs in terms of efficiency and
conforming to legislative intent.
Research

Methods

The current study could be classified as a qualitative interpretive field-based study which attempts to solicit the interpretations and impressions of important organizational actors involved in the GAO audit report review process concerning
events that have already taken place. In addition, the researcher
used unobtrusive techniques such as archival analysis to capture the formal, documented aspects of this process.
Interviews
One of the most important aspects of field research is gaining access to the setting of interest [Berg, 1989]. Toward this
end, the researcher had conducted semi-structured interviews
with GAO employees at various levels in two phases of data
gathering. The purpose of these early interviews was to gain a
general understanding of the institutional and the technical environments of the GAO and to establish personal contact based
u p o n which the second phase could be founded. During the first
phase, interviews were sporadic and were preceded and followed by extensive research on the GAO and available documentation. Before the second phase of the study (i.e., the fieldwork) could be initiated, extensive telephone interviews were
conducted with such individuals as the Associate Director of
one GAO Division as to who would function as a liaison for the
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol21/iss1/13
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study and how the study was to be conducted. It was important
and necessary to have a liaison office to legitimize the activities
of the researcher in the eyes of the organizational participants
and also to facilitate the data gathering process.
Intensive and extensive interviews were then conducted
with a sample of members of the GAO spanning all levels involved with the audit report review process. These members
included the senior-most members of the GAO such as Charles
H. Bowsher, the Comptroller General of the GAO, Elmer Staats,
the former Comptroller General of the GAO (1966-1981), Assistant Comptroller Generals, Directors, and Assistant Directors
down to senior evaluators and evaluators. These individuals
spanned a variety of functions, ranging from the practitioner
and administrative components within the divisions sampled, to
the administrative components outside of these divisions. In addition, members outside the GAO such as press reporters, Congressional staffers, and agency officials were interviewed to provide an outside perspective as to the audit report review process
and audit reports.
Archival Analysis
To add strength to the data gathered during the interview
phase, concurrent reviews and studies were undertaken of both
private and public archival material. To grasp a more complete
understanding of the review process, the "master product folders" of three jobs of three divisions of the GAO were requested.
The "master product folder" is a highly confidential file containing, among other things, sets of report drafts with comments
from various GAO members as it moves through the review
pipeline. As a result of this confidentiality, the GAO members
requested that no copies be made of the contents of these folders, a condition to which the researcher adhered.
In addition, newspaper reports in The Wall Street Journal,
The New York Times, and Washington Post were analyzed to
check for any references to the specific GAO audits that were
reviewed. The Congressional Record was also reviewed in a similar fashion.
In addition to a review of the newspaper indexes to check
for references to specific audits during the period of the audit,
the indexes of The Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, The
New York Times, Los Angeles Times, Christian Science Monitor,
Chicago Tribune, Boston Globe, and the Atlanta Constitution
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were reviewed for a citation count of the GAO press coverage
over the past five years.
History of GAO Leadership
To keep the GAO relatively free from political involvement,
the two top officials of the GAO, the Comptroller General and
the Assistant Comptroller General, have fifteen-year appointments. They are appointed by the President of the United States,
subject to Senate confirmation, and are only removable by a
joint resolution of Congress for clearly specified reasons. This
removal clause allows the GAO leadership to operate independently of executive interference. It was this clause that caused
President Woodrow Wilson to veto the Budget and Accounting
Act in 1921 [Trask, 1991]. Wilson thought that the power to
remove should lie within the President's office. However, President Harding signed the bill in 1921, thus creating the independent Comptroller General.
Comptroller General John Raymond

McCarl

John Raymond McCarl was the first Comptroller General of
the GAO. He was a lawyer by profession and therefore looked
u p o n the problem of accounting for public money, not as an
accounting problem, but rather as a legal one, where legality
was defined by Congressional intent. The authority of the
Comptroller General to countersign expenditure warrants made
the legality question of paramount importance to agencies. To
avoid the embarrassment of being turned down, the agencies
consulted with the GAO to make sure that their disbursements
conformed with the GAO's interpretation of Congressional intent.
McCarl, himself, received mixed reviews [Flesher, 1993;
Mosher, 1984]. On the one hand, he was lauded for his conformance with the letter of the law. On the other hand, this
conformance made him appear to be inflexible and despotic. It
was during his tenure that the Division of Law was renamed the
Office of General Counsel (OGC) in 1928. In 1930, this legal office had 29 attorneys recovering over a million dollars in debts
owed to the United States Government. During McCarl's tenure,
the OGC also prepared as many as 784 reports for Congress and
the President, along with over 5,000 legal decisions.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol21/iss1/13
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Comptroller General Lindsay Carter Warren
Lindsay Carter Warren was the second long-tenure Comptroller General of the GAO and was appointed by Roosevelt in
1940. Warren's tenure saw two notable events taking place; the
first was the New Deal, which resulted in larger problems for
the GAO by creating more agencies with larger budgets and
greater discretionary powers for public servants [Falker, 1986].
Secondly, America's participation in World War II sent government expenditures skyrocketing.
After World War II, Warren instituted a number of innovations in the GAO's mode of operating. He started working with
agencies in a more cooperative manner than did his predecessors. Aside from compliance audits, Warren broadened the
GAO's audit functions to review audit systems and management
effectiveness of agencies [Flesher and Flesher, 1989]. He did
away with the centralization of GAO activities and established
the practice of on-site audits. After Congress passed legislation
in the early 1940s requiring the GAO to audit military expenditures, Warren established as many as 276 on-site locations for
contract audits. This was necessary in order to be able to deal
with the volume of payments to be made, claims to be settled
from war contractors and armed force members, and auditing
of transport payments. He also established regional offices outside of Washington, D.C., both within the country and outside
of it, starting with Europe and thereafter in East Asia and Latin
America.

Comptroller General Joseph Campbell
Joseph Campbell was appointed as Comptroller General in
1955. Campbell was an accountant by profession and was first
appointed to the Atomic Energy Commission before being
nominated by President Eisenhower as the Comptroller General
of the GAO. His initial appointment was blocked by Democrats
who were not pleased with his involvement while he was with
the Atomic Energy Commission in the Dixon-Yates project, an
Eisenhower proposal to provide electric power to the city of
Memphis by bypassing the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)
and working instead with the Atomic Energy Commission. He
was considered to be an extremely tough leader who believed in
working through the hierarchy of the organization. He was inPublished by eGrove, 1994
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tolerant of mistakes and expected to have information about
audits at his fingertips.
As a professional accountant, he believed that audits were
conducted to identify mistakes and consequently encouraged
the GAO auditors to place their emphasis there. Campbell's audit approach alienated him from both the departments and
agencies as well as some elements in Congress who thought that
the GAO had become overly aggressive. It was Campbell's philosophy of trying improve the auditing of defense work that
resulted in the rapid increase of reports dealing with defense
contracts. This number went up from 48 reports in 1964 to 57
in 1965. However, strongly worded, negatively oriented titles
resulted in objections from both the Department of Defense
(DOD) and defense contractors [Task, 1991]. This agenda resulted in the Holifield Hearings of 1965 which was chaired by
Chester Holifield, a Democrat from California. The hearings expressed a dissatisfaction with the style, format and content of
GAO reports; the handling of confidential data, and the naming
of officials in reports etc. This report resulted in a change of
GAO procedures and, some say, even in leadership. Campbell
sought and was granted premature retirement due to ill-health.
He was succeeded by Elmer Staats.

Comptroller General Elmer Staats
Elmer Staats was appointed as Comptroller General in
1966. Staats held a doctorate in Public Administration from the
University of Minnesota. He was regarded by many to be extremely politically conscious and sensitive to Congressional
needs, both Democrat and Republican. Having been a director
with the Bureau of Budget (BOB), he was well aware of the
workings of Capitol Hill.
Staats believed in better government and instituted program
evaluation audits in a more pervasive m a n n e r t h a n did his predecessors. Unlike Campbell, Staats did not place as m u c h emphasis on the auditing of defense contracts, preferring to concentrate on evaluation of such social programs, such as the poverty program. Congressional requests were welcomed and personal relationships with Congressional staffers were encouraged. GAO's services to Congress were expanded by adding advisory services in reviewing and drafting proposed legislation. In
addition, Staats broadened the employee expertise at the GAO,
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol21/iss1/13
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consistent with the renewed focus on program auditing, by employing larger numbers of non-accountants.
Another notable step under Staats' leadership was the participation in the International Organization of Supreme Audit
Institutions (INTOSAI) founded in the early 1950s in Vienna,
Austria. The INTOSAI is a consortium of supreme audit agencies, like the GAO, from various countries. It currently has a 150
members and holds regular triennial international conferences
designed to advance and develop more effective audit approaches in governmental auditing.
In summary, under the Staats leadership, the GAO went a
long way toward establishing its legitimacy in the eyes of Congress. Elmer Staats retired in 1981 and was succeeded by
Charles Bowsher, the current Comptroller General.
Just before appointing Charles Bowsher in 1981, President
Reagan made it a point to emphasize his own administration's
efforts to attack the problem of waste and to acknowledge the
GAO's contribution in this regard. In a memorandum issued to
all heads of agencies and departments on March 26, 1981, he
said,
I expect each of you to provide the necessary support
and cooperation to ensure that our objective is accomplished. One specific action I am asking you to take is
to designate a top level individual who will have the
responsibility for following up on the recommendations
of your official who is responsible for coordinating efforts to eliminate fraud and waste and the recommendation of the General Accounting Office (emphasis
added).
Comptroller General Charles H. Bowsher
The current Comptroller General, Charles Bowsher, was appointed by President Reagan on July 9, 1981 for a period of 15
years. Charles Bowsher received his bachelor's degree from the
University of Illinois in 1953 and a master's degree from the
University of Chicago in 1956. He served as the Assistant Secretary of the Navy from 1967 to 1971 where he was in charge of
financial management and had fiscal responsibilities of about
20 billion dollars with about 4,500 people working under him.
During his tenure as Assistant Secretary, Bowsher had several
interactions with members from the GAO, Organization of Management and Budget (OMB), and Congressional Committees.
Published by eGrove, 1994
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From 1971 until his appointment to the helm of the GAO,
Charles Bowsher was a managing partner with Arthur Andersen
& Company in Washington D.C., specializing in the government
sector.
Mr. Bowsher has generally followed Elmer Staats' agenda,
continually attempting to improve the image and work processes of the GAO. In recent times, he has been involved with
the issue of deficit reduction. In this regard, he observed that
Nineteen-Ninety was the year in which the budget crisis came to dominate the nation's political agenda.
Both in the administration and on Capitol Hill, policy
makers finally faced the facts about the deficit. (GAO,
1990, p. 2)
He has encouraged GAO employees to testify before Congress as
evidenced by a dramatic 41% increase in the number of testimonies given by GAO employees in 1990 over 1989.
As indicated earlier, one of the purposes of the paper is to
examine the influence of the two most recent Comptroller Generals (i.e., Elmer Staats and Charles Bowsher) on the GAO audit
report review process. This is discussed in the next section.
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF GAO LEADERSHIP
IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AUDIT
REPORT REVIEW PROCESS
The Staats Years
Staats headed the General Accounting Office from 1966 till
1981, and much of what the GAO does today is attributed by
participants to his leadership initiative. During an intensive interview conducted as part of the current research, Mr. Staats
recounted that, after terms at the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) and Program Planning and Budget (PPB), he
took over the GAO with a view to ascertaining how best the
GAO could serve Congress. He observed,
Upon my conversations at the Hill, I found that the Hill
on average did not appreciate GAO work and found it
not relevant. In most cases, GAO work was considered
irrelevant in terms of subject matter and slow in terms
of timing. About that time, only 8% of GAO work was
Congressionally requested.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol21/iss1/13
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In order to improve the GAO's usefulness to Congress, one
of the primary areas that Elmer Staats focused on was the audit
report. In a m e m o r a n d u m to his staff dated February 24, 1970,
Mr. Staats stressed the need to improve the language of audit
reports. In that m e m o r a n d u m he said:
The language in many GAO reports continues to be of
concern to me. In general, the reports are reasonably
clear, if carefully read, and the information presented is
usually convincing. However, the quality of the language used in many instances could be substantially
improved. Too often, language is repeated unnecessarily, and the language is stilted, unnecessarily complicated, ponderous and sometimes even a bit pompous.
In seeking to establish a n action agenda, Elmer Staats
thought it necessary to begin this task by tracing GAO's mission
back to its legislative history from the Budget and Accounting
Act of 1921, both in terms of its stated and apparent intent. His
interpretation led him to believe that the GAO's role in governm e n t accountability was to conduct financial compliance, efficiency/economy
and program results audits all of which were
subsequently articulated in Government Auditing Standards
[e.g., GAO 1972; 1981; 1988].
By establishing this, the GAO was able to extend its range
of audit activities from the voucher audits of old to economy/
efficiency and program results audits. This new jurisdictional
domain, in turn, allowed the GAO to develop standards of audit
conduct to cover the new types of audits. In addition, the GAO
also specified standards for their audit reports as guidance for
their auditors. It specified that the contents of the audit reports
should have sections on objectives, scope and methodology, audit findings and conclusions, and the causes of agency problems
and recommendations for improvement.
As mentioned above, the extension and articulation of audit
report requirements in the yellow book allowed Mr. Staats to
t h e n establish a basis for audit report review. Importantly, he
felt that the audit report was an "institutional product," not one
to be attributed to any one individual or audit team, but to the
organization as a whole. To increase the quality of these reports, among other things, Mr. Staats worked with a panel of
consultants from different backgrounds allowing him to utilize
a diverse range of expertise. Out of this consultation, Mr. Staats
instituted a form of centralized report review so that "an instituPublished by eGrove, 1994
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tional consistency in the report was achieved to some extent".
This centralized report review function was to be housed in a n
administrative component [Freidson, 1986] of the GAO, known
as the Office of Policy (OP). To Mr. Staats, this report review
function was a way of ensuring report quality in terms of its
technical characteristics. In a m e m o r a n d u m issued in 1979, he
said,
Procedural controls are available to help ensure the
quality of the final report. These controls include the
independent verification of the facts, findings, conclusions and recommendations contained in the report;
careful review by those responsible for the report; and
advanced review by program administrators and other
officials responsible for the program being evaluated . .
. the independent verification of all the facts contained
in the report is an important quality control procedure.
Consistent with this view, Mr. Staats observed when interviewed, "The only way the GAO can survive is through its credibility, non-partisanship, and professional competence."
The Bowsher

Years

Staats's successor, Charles Bowsher, shared many of the
concerns that Elmer Staats's expressed and built on Staats's
progress in adding quality to GAO reports. In this regard,
Bowsher set up a Reports Task Force (RTF) in the early part of
his tenure to address the issue of audit report quality. This task
force was headed by Ira Goldstein, who is now with Arthur
Andersen in Washington, D.C., Charles Bowsher's former organizational affiliation. In order to get a feel for the motivation
that led to the Reports Task Force (RTF), an extensive interview
was conducted with its former chairman, Ira Goldstein.
Goldstein recounted that while Bowsher was at Arthur
Andersen, he used GAO reports and therefore had some prior
impressions concerning their quality, believing that GAO reports were "not very professional." The Reports Task Force
emerged as a consequence of a meeting where Charles Bowsher
shared his concerns about GAO report quality. The RTF activity
was held in two phases: a preliminary scoping phase of about
three weeks and a second more detailed phase of about six
m o n t h s . During the second phase, a core of senior GAO managers including Mr. Goldstein closely examined approximately 100
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol21/iss1/13

12

Basu: of
The
Institutional
Leadership
onal effects
leadership:
TheEffects
UnitedofStates
General Accounting Office and its 267
audit report re
GAO reports and tried to develop standards for report quality by
rating the reports. It was thought at the time that the concept of
quality was largely "cultural" and "dependent on the individual
reading the report".
Based upon the collective experiences of this task force, and
on receiving extensive feedback from Congress, the RTF came
u p with a list of ten items that would comprise report quality.
These items included usefulness, timeliness, accuracy, completeness, constructiveness, convincingness, objectivity, clarity,
simplicity, and conciseness. The RTF also recommended that
the focus on quality be built into the front end of the job rather
t h a n during the report review stage. At that point, there was less
d i s a g r e e m e n t on the c o m p o n e n t s of quality b u t m o r e on
whether the individual reports that had been examined by the
Task Force met those standards.
To help in disseminating this message of quality to the rest
of the organization, a centralized office called the Office of Quality Assurance (OQA) was established. The OQA became the new
centralized report review office, taking over the function from
the Office of Policy in 1983. It was judged that the OQA could
function as a place where GAO employees could be trained in
the concept of report quality and where auditor would be given
greater interaction with report reviewers, thereby developing a
"collective consciousness" in a Durkheimian sense [Aron, 1967,
p . 15]. The purpose behind developing a c o m m o n consciousness
of a quality report was to allow the GAO to move in the direction desired by Charles Bowsher. As a result of this endeavor,
Mr. Goldstein observed that "over a period of time, the senior
m e m b e r s of the GAO began to get a sense for what Mr. Bowsher's philosophy of quality meant." The OQA also tried to instill this in a more widespread manner by holding presentations
and training sessions for GAO employees.
Eventually, the division heads thought that, given sufficient
resources, they could handle the responsibility of report review
at the divisional level. The OQA continued to spread the message of quality by training report reviewers for divisions, experimenting first with the Resources, Community and Economics
Division (RCED), and then with other divisions. It was then u p
to the division heads to disseminate the message of report quality to their subordinates, such as Issue Area directors, and for
t h e m to extend the message downwardly. Once it was felt that
progress had been made, the OQA was disbanded in 1986.
Published by eGrove, 1994
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Timeliness

The GAO, however, has not been without its critics. In
1985, the Brooks Committee, chaired by Congressman Jack
Brooks of the Government Oversight Committee, criticized the
GAO for lack of timeliness in processing its reports. The Committee report indicated that its members thought the GAO took
an inordinately long time to process its reports through report
review once the fieldwork was completed.
The issue of timeliness has existed since the early 1970s and
the problem was recognized as such by Elmer Staats. He attempted to rectify the situation and improve the processing of
reports [memoranda dated March 29, 1972; and May 1974] by
keeping track of delayed reports on a monthly basis in order to
expedite their publication. On this point, a Congressional staffer
who participated in the study observed that "Congress needs
information quickly to make decisions. The review process is
necessary, but is probably an overkill. They could kill half the
levels on review and still not lose too much." Staats went on to
point out that, in his opinion, "the GAO was an ivory tower, a
think-tank that needed its time to function." At the same time,
he acknowledged the efforts of Charles Bowsher in attempting
to correct the situation.
In support of the staffer's assertion, Bowsher issued a
memorandum dated September 6, 1985, titled "Improving
GAO's Responsiveness to Congressional Requests." In this document, Mr. Bowsher indicated that feedback from Congress continued to criticize the timeliness or the lack of it on GAO's part
in meeting deadlines and issuing audit reports. In order to facilitate improvement, Bowsher suggested a greater involvement
on the part of Congressional staff at targeting specific areas of
audit of more use to them where time might be of the essence.
He observed that:
Over the last few years, we have undertaken several
efforts to improve our capacity to address the needs of
the committees and the members of Congress. We have
improved report quality, refocused on issue area plans,
and reorganized the GAO to better accomplish its mission.
We recently launched a program taking a comprehensive look at how we do our work. The Assistant Comptroller General for Operations and a steering committee
of senior GAO members have developed an approach
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol21/iss1/13
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that will involve everyone in further improving GAO
operations, primarily regarding timeliness and overall
efficiency of our work.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
In the early years of the GAO's existence, Comptroller General Raymond McCarl focused the GAO's activities on enforcing
agency compliance with the letter of the law. As a result, under
his tenure, the Division of Law was born which is now known
as the Office of General Counsel (OGC). At the same time, his
lack of on-site auditing resulted in work backlogs with lack of
attention from Congress. Comptroller General Warren inherited
the GAO at a time when government was getting much larger.
He professionalized the GAO as an audit agency by conducting
on-site audits, instituting a comprehensive audit program and
setting up various regional offices all over the country and even
abroad. Comptroller General Campbell continued to professionalize by recruiting heavily from colleges and universities. However, his policy of aloofness alienated the GAO from the agencies and Congress partially resulting in the Holifield Hearings in
1966 and thereby damaging relations with both constituents.
Comptroller General Staats improved relations by expanding the scope of GAO audits to concentrate the Agency's efforts
on performance audits and service to Congress. Comptroller
General Bowsher continued on Staats' path by focusing on the
Congressional customer and attempting to increase GAO resources.
In the area of audit reporting, the roles of Elmer Staats and
Charles Bowsher have been extremely important. Staats' proactive approach in focusing on the Congressional customer allowed him to define government accountability, broaden the
audit scope of GAO audits and thereby generate audit reports
spanning a wide range of government issues. This meant,
among other things, focusing on the language of the audit report in an effort to improve its comprehensibility. Guidelines
for audit reporting were articulated in the GAO 'Yellow Book'
and enforced by report reviewers in a centralized report review
wing of the GAO. This allowed the GAO to work towards standardization of the audit report in a manner consistent with
Elmer Staats' initiative.
Charles Bowsher also realized that the GAO audit report
was extremely important and formed a Reports Task Force
Published by eGrove, 1994
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(RTF) to help study the quality of GAO reports. After centralizing the audit report review process in a unit known as the Office
of Quality Assurance (OQA), the process was then decentralized
to operating divisions. In fact, the audit reporting process as it
is today, is a result of the directives of both Elmer Staats and
Charles Bowsher.
Past research in accounting and auditing has focused its
attention on the effect of leadership on the accomplishment of
specific tasks and the effect on team performance. In contrast,
the study of leadership on organizational activities and structure has been underresearched. This paper demonstrates how
organizational leaders' perceptions and reactions to the organizational environment impacts the long-term operations and
structure of an organization.
A federal audit agency like the GAO operates in an environment where the demands of multiple constituents have to be
satisfied in order to assure long-term survival and legitimacy
[Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 1990]. As
the high profile leader of such an organization, the Comptroller
General has to be able to set the tone for quality audit work at
the GAO, assure Congress that it is meeting its audit oversight
needs and demonstrate non-partisanship and objectivity in the
conduct of its audit engagements. The initiatives of the organizational leader have not only short-term, but also long-term implications in their effect on accounting and audit activities, a
point that is often overlooked in accounting research.
An important audit organization like the GAO has a great
deal of impact on legislation and public perceptions through its
audit reporting and other related activities. Future research involving the GAO could focus on the historical relationship of the
GAO and various audited agencies over the years. The role of
leadership in these relationships could be studied to provide
insight into the influence that various Comptrollers General
have had in its development. Further research in the audit reporting area could examine the ways in which GAO reports are
used by Congressional members to satisfy their own political
agendas and how it may impact the funding of federal programs.
This paper has attempted to address some research gaps by
examining the historical role of past GAO Comptroller Generals
in general and the audit report review process in particular. It is
hoped that this paper would prompt accounting researchers to
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol21/iss1/13
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examine the extremely important role of organizational leaders
in their study of accounting issues.
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